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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates the operating performance of buyout firms that exit through IPOs 
using a sample of 178 UK companies over the period 1980-1998. In particular, we 
consider the operating performance of buyout firms measured by cash flow to total 
assets, asset turnover and cash flow to sales, from three years before IPO to five years 
following IPO. We find that operating performance steadily increases before IPO, 
peaking in the year immediately prior to flotation. Following IPO, operating 
performance steadily declines, and within five years is not significantly different from 
the industry average. We go on to investigate the role of private equity (PE) providers 
in the performance of buyout IPOs. In contrast with evidence for US venture capital 
backed non-buyout IPOs, we find no significant difference in pre-IPO or post-IPO 
operating performance between PE-backed and non-PE-backed buyouts. However, we 
do find a difference in performance between buyouts backed by prestigious and non-
prestigious PE firms. We also find that, consistent with other studies, younger, less 
experienced PE firms tend to bring their buyouts to IPO more quickly than more 
experienced PE firms, and that these firms experience lower post-IPO operating 
performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The past twenty years has seen a proliferation in buyout activity in the UK. The UK 
buyout market is the largest in Europe with a value of €30 billion in 2004, 
representing 38% of the total European buyout market (CMBOR, 2004). Buyouts play 
an important role in the UK’s overall merger and acquisition market and have become 
one of the most important driving forces in corporate restructuring. Indeed, the value 
of buyouts in recent years accounts for over half of the value of all takeovers in the 
UK (CMBOR, 2003/2004). The importance of the buyout market is also manifested 
through its contribution to the returns of the UK private equity (PE) sector. While the 
performance of UK PE funds in the early and development stages (i.e. venture capital 
investment) lags behind that achieved by their US counterparts, PE investment in the 
buyout markets generates substantial returns (Burgel, 2000; EVCA, 2005).  
 
The increasing number of buyout transactions and the high level of returns that they 
generate for buyout investors have prompted many to question the source of buyout 
value. Early evidence on this issue comes mainly from the US where large leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs) of public corporations or their divisions dominate the market. Several 
explanations have been put forward as potential sources of buyout value, including tax 
savings, private information and value creation.
1
 However, only the value creation 
argument seems to have received substantial empirical support. Jensen (1989) asserts 
that the capital and organisational structures of buyout firms are remarkably efficient 
in terms of aligning the interest of the managers with that of the buyout investors. 
Such structures can consequently significantly reduce the principal-agent problems in 
large, mature companies and ultimately lead to better performance. Consistent with 
Jensen’s view, Kaplan (1989), Smith (1990), Singh (1990) and Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990) all document an improvement in the accounting performance of 
US firms that underwent an LBO.   
 
While sharing many common features, notable differences exist between US LBOs 
and UK buyouts. For example, the source of UK buyouts comprises not only public 
corporations or their divisions, which are the common targets of US LBOs, but also 
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 See Singh (1990) for a detailed discussion of the alternative explanations of the 
source of buyout value.   
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family-run and private businesses and firms that are in receivership (CMBOR, 2004). 
As a result, buyouts in the UK tend to vary to a greater extent in size than they do in 
they UK. Furthermore, UK buyouts are not as highly geared as their US counterparts 
and give more preference to the use of equity financing (Wright et al., 1992).
2
 There 
has also been a significant change in the nature of buyout transactions over time in the 
UK. Initially, the buyout market in the UK was dominated by management-led 
buyouts (MBOs) or buy-ins (MBIs), whereby either the incumbent management of a 
company or a team of outside managers acquires a significant stake in a company, 
usually in co-operation with outside financiers such as banks or PE investors (Deloitte 
& Touche LLP, 2004). The proportion of such MBO/MBI transactions in the overall 
buyout market, however, has declined significantly since the early 1990s. Instead, it is 
the investor-led buyouts (IBOs) which are becoming more prevalent. PE investors 
have taken an increasingly proactive style, actively seeking buyout opportunities and 
taking the lead in the buyout process. Despite these differences, the limited empirical 
evidence on the performance of UK buyouts appears to echo the findings of US 
studies for LBOs. In particular, Wright and Wilson (1996) show that UK buyouts on 
average perform significantly better than non-buyout companies over the three to five 
years after the buyout transaction, in terms of both return on total assets and profit per 
employee. These performance improvements have been attributed to both a reduction 
in agency costs and enhanced entrepreneurial orientation (Green, 1992; Wright et al, 
1992; Wright et al, 2001).  
 
While some buyouts remain private for a considerable period, many make their exit at 
a relatively early stage (Kaplan, 1991; Wright et al., 1995). Flotation on the stock 
market through an IPO provides one of the most favoured exit routes for buyouts, 
owing to the attractive financial rewards and the positive reputation effect that often 
comes with it. The widely documented evidence on the strong performance of buyout 
firms in general raises the question whether those buyout firms that choose to exit 
through an IPO are able to sustain such performance after IPO. This is particularly 
interesting since existing research finds that IPO firms in general experience long run 
underperformance in terms of stock returns (Ritter, 1991; Loughran et al., 1994) and a 
gradual decline in operating performance as measured by accounting ratios in the five 
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 For example, Holthausen & Larcker (1996) report that the mean ratio of debt to total 
capital for reverse LBOs in the US is 83%. In the UK, in contrast, debt normally 
accounts for only around 50% of total capital (CMBOR, 2003). 
 4
years post-IPO (Jain and Kini, 1994).
3
  When the post-IPO performance of reverse US 
LBOs is examined as a separate group, it appears that these companies experience a 
similar deterioration in their operating performance (Holthausen and Larker, 1996), 
but no deterioration in stock price performance, suggesting that the market anticipates 
the decline in operating performance and impounds this expectation into the stock 
price at the time of IPO (Degeorge and Zeckhauser, 1993). This decline in operating 
performance has been found to be closely associated with changes in managerial 
ownership (Bruton et al., 2002). In contrast with the US, evidence on the performance 
of UK buyout IPOs is scarce and, to date, has focused only on post-IPO stock price 
performance. In particular, Jelic et al. (2005) examine the stock price performance of 
a sample of UK buyouts that exit through an IPO and, consistent with studies of US 
reverse LBOs, find no evidence of significant abnormal returns. Stock returns, 
however, are only measurable from the day of the IPO and so the question of whether 
buyout companies are able to sustain their operating performance after exiting through 
an IPO remains unclear, since any expected decline in operating performance may 
already have been impounded in the stock price at the time of the IPO. Only by 
explicitly considering operating performance, which can be measured both pre-IPO 
and post-IPO, can we evaluate the impact of an IPO on the performance of buyout 
firms. 
 
A neglected area in buyout research is the impact of PE investors on the performance 
of buyout firms. While there is a large body of literature on early stage venture capital 
investment, there has been surprisingly little research into whether the involvement of 
PE investors adds value to their portfolio firms. The PE industry in the UK is the 
largest in Europe and second only to the US, globally, with the level of PE investment 
in the UK equivalent to 1.1% of UK GDP. Of this, only 21% is venture capital 
financing while 89% is invested in the buyout sector (EVCA, 2005).
4
 The 
                                                
3
 More recently some studies have found that the long-run stock price performance of 
IPO firms is sensitive to the estimation methods used. See Brav and Gompers (1997), 
Espenlaub et al. (2000).  
4
 In Europe, the term ‘private equity’ is often used interchangeably with ‘venture 
capital’. In contrast, in the US, ‘venture capital’ investment refers solely to the 
provision of equity funds at the start-up or development stage. In Europe, the term 
‘venture capital’ is also used to include investments at the buyout stage. To avoid 
confusion, we use the term ‘private equity’ throughout the paper to describe the 
industry as a whole, encompassing both venture capital (the seed to expansion stages 
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development of the UK PE industry over the past two decades has been inextricably 
linked to the growth in buyout activity. On the one hand, buyout transactions have 
comprised the largest share of PE investors’ returns, while on the other hand, the 
increasing amount of PE funds available for investment as well as the mounting level 
of competition within the PE industry has helped drive up both the volume and value 
of buyout activity. Such a close-knit relationship demands a better understanding of 
the role that UK PE investors play in the buyout firms that they finance. In particular, 
do they act solely as financier and limit their contribution to financial engineering, or 
do they also add value by more actively monitoring and contributing to their portfolio 
companies as US venture capitalists do?
5
   
 
The objectives of this paper are therefore twofold. Firstly, we evaluate the operating 
performance of UK buyout firms that exit through an IPO. Using a sample of 178 
firms over the period 1980-98, we consider the operating performance of buyouts 
from three years before IPO until five years following IPO. Secondly, we investigate 
the impact of PE financing on buyout IPOs. In particular, we test whether the 
involvement of PE investors significantly affects operating performance in both the 
pre-IPO and post-IPO periods. We also test the reputation effect of PE investors by 
considering whether experienced PE investors offer a greater contribution to the 
operating performance of buyout LBOs. Additionally, we test the grandstanding effect 
by considering whether young PE investors tend to rush buyout firms to IPO in an 
attempt to establish their reputation. 
 
We find that operating performance steadily increases before IPO, peaking in the year 
immediately prior to flotation. Following IPO, operating performance steadily 
declines, and within five years, is not significantly different from the industry average. 
In contrast with evidence for US leveraged buyouts, we find no significant difference 
in pre-IPO or post-IPO operating performance between PE-backed and non-PE-
backed buyouts. However, we do find a difference in performance between buyouts 
                                                                                                                                       
of investment) and buy-outs.  When the term ‘venture capital’ is used, it refers to early 
stage investment only.  
5
 Jelic et al. (2005) consider the impact of PE investor involvement on the stock price 
performance of UK buyouts that exited through IPO but find no significant effect.  
Again, however, by considering only stock price performance, their results are unable 
to shed light on the expected impact of PE financing on operating performance that is 
already impounded in the stock price at the time of the IPO. 
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backed by prestigious and non-prestigious PE firms. We also find that, consistent with 
other studies, younger, less experienced PE firms tend to bring their buyouts to IPO 
more quickly than more experienced PE firms, and that these firms experience lower 
post-IPO operating performance. 
 
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide a discussion of the 
relevant theory and develop the hypotheses to be tested. In Section 3, we describe the 
data and estimation methods. The results of the estimation and hypothesis testing are 
reported in Section 4. Section 5 offers a summary and conclusion. 
 
2. Existing Literature and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1 Buyout Performance  
 
Studies of US buyout performance have, in most cases, focused on the measurement 
of operating performance before and after the leveraged buyout (LBO) of large public 
corporations or their divisions (see, for example, Smith, 1989; Kaplan, 1989; Singh, 
1990; Phan and Hill, 1995). Common measures of operating performance are firms’ 
cash flow or operating income deflated by total assets or sales. Most studies report 
significant improvement in these measures. For example, Kaplan (1989) finds that in 
comparison with the year before the buyout, the ratio of operating income to assets of 
a sample of 48 LBOs increases by 15% while the ratio of operating income to sales 
increases by 19% over the three-year period after the buyout. Smith (1990) finds that 
improvements in operating performance are correlated with changes in leverage and 
managerial ownership induced by the buyout. Such correlation is also documented by 
Phan and Hill (1995). These findings support Jensen’s (1989) view that buyout 
induced organisational changes have positive impact on firms’ performance. Wright et 
al. (1996) reveal similar improvements in the operating performance of UK buyouts. 
They tracked 251 UK buyouts for up to six years after the buyout. In the early years, 
no significant differences in performance are identified. However, three to five years 
following the transaction, buyout firms on average perform significantly better than 
comparable non-buyout firms both in terms of the return on total assets and profit to 
employee measures. Wright et al. attribute this pattern of performance to the fact that 
buyouts frequently involve underperforming firms and that although action is taken 
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immediately following the buyout to improve performance, it may take some time 
before the firm can significantly outstrip the sector average.   
 
It is reasonable to assume that buyouts that manage to exit through an IPO should 
generally perform well prior to IPO since they have to meet various listing 
requirements and win the confidence of potential subscribers. In addition, it should be 
to the advantage of the buyout firm to go public when their performance is relatively 
strong. We would therefore expect the operating performance of buyout IPOs prior to 
flotation to be even higher than those of non-IPO buyouts. The first hypothesis that 
we test is therefore as follows. 
 
H1: Buyout IPOs demonstrate superior operating performance prior to IPO, relative 
to industry average performance.   
 
The evidence on post-buyout performance improvement provides support for the 
claim that the buyout as an organisational form is more efficient than the public 
company. Yet many buyouts choose to float on the market through an IPO a few years 
after the buyout transaction. Such a phenomenon raises the question of whether the 
buyout induced performance improvement is sustainable after these firms go public. 
Indeed, existing research on IPO firms in general have noted a significant decline in 
operating performance after flotation. For example, Jain and Kini (1994) find that the 
operating performance of a sample of 682 US IPOs deteriorates significantly relative 
to the performance in the financial year just before the IPO. In addition, they show 
that IPO firms outperform their industry average in the year before IPO but 
underperform the industry average in the first two years after flotation. Jain and Kini  
find that post-IPO operating performance is positively related to equity retention by 
the original entrepreneurs. Mikkelson et al. (1997) finds a similar pattern of 
performance but note that the decline in performance is confined to the first full year 
of public trading, with no marked further decline occurring through ten years of 
public trading. In contrast with other studies, however, Mikkelson et al. find that the 
change in equity ownership that result from going public does not lead to a change in 
incentives that affect operating performance. Rather, they provide evidence that 
variation in performance after going public is explained largely by the size and age of 
the companies and by the presence of secondary sales. Size especially is the most 
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reliable determinant of performance during the first five years after IPO. These results 
are consistent with Brav and Gompers (1997) who show that long-run stock market 
underperformance of IPO firms is actually driven by size and book-to-market ratio. 
 
Research on the performance of buyout IPOs has focused on the US reverse LBO 
market (see, for example, Degeorge and Zeckhauser, 1993; Holthausen and Larker, 
1996; Bruton et al., 2002, etc.). Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) compare LBO 
operating performance with matched industry averages for the year before IPO (Year 
–1) and the year after IPO (Year +1). They find that reverse LBOs perform better than 
their industry counterparts in Year –1 but worse in Year +1. They observe a positive 
performance change from Year –1 to the IPO year, but the improvement is not 
sustained in Year +1. In terms of long run stock price performance, Degeorge and 
Zeckhauser (1993) find that reverse LBOs do not underperform comparison firms 
over a two-year horizon after IPO. They interpret this as a sign that the market has 
already anticipated the decline in post-LBO operating performance. One limitation of 
this study, however, is that their event window is not wide enough to provide any 
indication about long-run operating performance. In particular, the decline in 
operating performance in Year +1 may be a temporary phenomenon caused by a 
sudden increase in the denominator of the performance measure (the total assets of the 
firm) as shown in Mikkelson et al. (1997).   
 
Holthausen and Larker (1996) study the financial performance of reverse LBOs from 
the year prior to IPO to the fourth year after IPO. They find that the operating 
performance of their sample LBOs is significantly better than their respective industry 
average both at the time of IPO and for the four years after it, although they also 
report weak evidence of deterioration in operating performance in the post-IPO 
period. They also show that the variation in accounting performance subsequent to 
IPO is related to changes in the equity ownership of both management and other 
insiders but not to changes in leverage. Their findings on the long run market 
performance of the LBOs are consistent with those of Degeorge and Zeckhauser 
(1993), showing that reverse LBOs do not experience abnormal common stock 
performance following IPO. Moreover, reverse LBOs appear to be much better at 
maintaining their pre-IPO level of performance than typical IPO companies. This is 
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consistent with Mikkelson et al. (1997) as reverse LBOs are normally larger and more 
established than the typical IPO firm.
6
    
 
The US evidence suggests, therefore, that despite the differences between the reverse 
LBOs and the typical IPO firm, LBOs are nevertheless susceptible to a decline in 
post-IPO operating performance. The degree of deterioration, however, appears to be 
more moderate relative to typical IPO firms. The evidence on whether US LBOs can 
continuously outperform their industry peers after IPO is mixed. As to the post-IPO 
performance of buyouts in the UK, evidence is scarce. Jelic et al. (2005) examine the 
stock price performance of a sample of UK buyouts that exit through IPO. Similar to 
the US, they find no evidence of significant underperformance in the long run. There 
is no extant research that investigates the operating performance of UK buyouts after 
they become public. Given the fact that UK buyouts would experience a change in 
their capital and organisational structure that is similar to their US counterparts, there 
is no reason to expect that they would avoid a decline in their post-IPO operating 
performance. In fact, if changes in post-IPO performance are indeed affected by the 
size or age of an IPO firm (Mikkelson et al.,1997), an even more marked decline 
should be expected for UK buyouts as they vary a great deal more in terms of size and 
age than do US LBOs.  Hence our second hypothesis is as follows. 
 
H2:  Following flotation, the performance of buyout IPOs gradually declines and 
their lead over the industry average level diminishes. 
 
2.2 The Role of Private Equity Investors  
 
While a large number of studies (especially those concerning the US market) have 
investigated the role of the PE investors in venture capital stage investment, research 
concerning the role that PE investors play at the buyout stage is limited. A number of 
US studies have compared the post-IPO performance of the IPOs backed by early 
stage PE investors (VCs) and those with no PE backing. Jain and Kini (1995) argue 
that VCs in the US not only actively monitor their portfolio firms during the private 
period but also after IPO. This is because VCs usually continue to maintain a 
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 Mikkelson et al. (1997) finds that small, young companies underperform industry-
matched firms, while the performance of larger and more established firms is similar 
to the performance of industry-matched firms after going public. 
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significant equity position in the firm post-IPO, and their long-term continued 
involvement in the IPO market provides them with the incentive to maintain their 
reputation by carefully screening their investments and subsequently monitoring their 
performance in the aftermarket. In the UK, the situation is similar. Indeed, Espenlaub 
et al. (2001) show that existing shareholders, such as the directors and PE investors of 
IPO firms in the UK are often subject to more complex lock-in contracts than their US 
counterparts. In fact, the average length of the lock-in period for directors in the UK is 
as long as 561 days. Although no direct evidence is available to demonstrate how long 
PE investors must lock in their shares, it is reasonable to assume that they too will 
continue holding a significant proportion of equity in their portfolio firms for a 
considerable length of time after IPO. PE-backed IPOs should therefore continue to 
outperform non-PE-backed IPOs after flotation. Empirical evidence from the US on 
early stage PE seems to largely support such a conjecture. Jain and Kini (1995) show 
that while the performance of both the VC-backed and non-VC-backed groups 
deteriorates during the post-IPO period, the decline experienced by the VC-backed 
group is smaller. Furthermore, the market appears to recognise the value added by the 
VCs as reflected in higher price-earnings and market-to-book ratios at the time of the 
IPO. In terms of stock market performance, Brav & Gompers (1997) find that the 
involvement of VCs leads to higher equally-weighted returns during the five years 
after IPO, although the return differential between the two groups is substantially 
reduced when value weighting is used, suggesting the existence of a small firm effect.   
 
The evidence presented for European IPOs, however, suggests that European early 
stage PE investors are less able to contribute to their portfolio firms than are their US 
counterparts. In their study of UK IPOs, Espenlaub et al. (1999) find only weak 
evidence that VC backing is associated with better market performance in the long 
run. More recently, Rinderman (2003) finds that VC-backed issues in the German 
Neuer Markt, French Nouveau Marche and the UK techMARK do not typically 
outperform firms without VC backing in terms of either market or accounting 
performance. The difference in the performance of VC-backed early stage firms in the 
US and the UK could be partly explained by variation in their experience, knowledge 
and preferred investment styles. For example, Hege et al. (2003) argue that US VC 
investors possess sharper screening skills than their European counterparts, which 
leads to higher success rates among their portfolio firms. This is also consistent with 
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Landier (2001), who notes that US VC investors spend considerable time learning 
about the technological aspects of an investment both before and after first-time 
financing, whereas European VC investors are traditionally less ‘hands on’ than their 
US counterparts.   
 
The above-presented UK and European evidence on early stage PE investors casts 
doubt on whether PE-backed buyouts in the UK can produce significantly better 
performance than non-PE-backed buyouts. While it is understandable that ventures at 
the start-up/early stage are extremely vulnerable and hence more likely to benefit 
from the professional monitoring and guidance provided by their PE investors, in the 
case of buyouts, the level of input they need from the PE providers is probably 
minimal given their relatively longer operating history and lower risk level. PE 
involvement may only become important when there are serious problems that 
threaten the survival of the buyout. In particular, buyouts that reach IPO are more 
likely to be the strong performers in the PE investor’s portfolio and so PE backing 
might make little difference to these firms. This would be consistent with Jelic et al. 
(2005) who find that the involvement of PE investors on the whole does not affect the 
long run stock performance of buyout IPOs. In view of the evidence discussed above, 
our third hypothesis is as follows. 
 
H3: PE-backed buyout IPOs do not significantly outperform non-PE-backed IPOs.   
 
2.3 PE Investor Reputation 
 
A number of researchers have addressed the importance of recognising that the 
knowledge, experience and skills possessed by early stage PE investors (VCs) are 
heterogeneous (Timmons and Bygrave, 1986; Rindermann, 2003). Reputable VC 
investors are able to attract and select good quality ventures and make high value-
added contributions, which is critical to their portfolio firms’ performance. Research 
conducted in different countries has produced contradictory findings as to whether 
VCs add significant value to their portfolio firms. Yet, the empirical evidence seems 
to be unequivocal when it concerns the impact of reputable VCs on the firms that they 
back. Rosenstein et al. (1993) show that the entrepreneurs in their sample do not 
support the contention that, collectively, VC investors bring more ‘value added’ than 
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other outside board members. Nevertheless, CEOs with a top-20 VC firm as the lead 
investor do rate the value of the advice from their VC board members significantly 
higher than the advice from other outside board members. Sapienza et al. (1996) and 
Manigart et al. (2002) also present evidence that experienced VC investors are 
perceived to add more value to their portfolio firms than those that are inexperienced. 
In terms of long run market performance, Espenlaub et al. (1999) find that although 
VC-backed IPOs do not significantly outperform non-VC-backed IPOs, within the 
VC-backed sample there are systematic differences in the performance of IPOs 
associated with the reputation and experience of the VC investors. In particular, IPOs 
backed by older and/or larger funds experience substantially higher average three-year 
returns.   
 
In terms of the buyout stage PE investors, consistent with the evidence on early stage 
PE investors, Jelic et al. (2005) find that although, collectively, PE-backed buyouts do 
not generate higher long run returns than non-PE-backed buyouts after going public, 
buyouts backed by more prestigious PE investors perform better than those backed by 
less prestigious PEs, in all 36 months post-IPO. To test the impact of PE investor 
reputation on buyout operating performance, our fourth hypothesis is as follows. 
 
H4: Buyout IPOs that are backed by prestigious PE investors are able to produce 
superior operating performance relative to those backed by not so prestigious PE 
investors. 
 
2.4 PE Investor Grandstanding 
 
Gompers (1996) has developed a theory called “grandstanding” based on the 
reputation-building phenomenon in the early stage PE sector (the VC sector).  He 
argues that the reputation of a VC investor is a key determinant in the ability to raise 
follow-up funds. VC funds typically have a set life span of seven to ten years and it is 
common practice that VC firms start to raise the follow-up funds before the initial 
fund is wound up. For young VCs without a long track record to back them up, it is 
essential to signal to potential investors their ability to generate high returns before 
raising the new fund. Successfully taking one or more portfolio firms public through 
an IPO provides an attractive opportunity, not only because of the high returns it may 
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provide to the PE investors, but also because of the positive publicity associated with 
it.  On the basis of these arguments, Gompers hypothesises that young VCs may bring 
companies public earlier than the older ones so that they may grandstand and 
ultimately raise more cash for the follow-up fund. He also finds empirical evidence in 
support of this argument, showing that the duration of young VC investors’ board 
service is on average fourteen months shorter than that of older VC investors. 
Moreover, the IPO companies that younger VC firms finance are nearly two years 
younger and more under-priced when they go public than companies backed by more 
experienced VC investors. Although Gompers’ grandstand argument is developed in 
the setting of the early stage PE investors (VCs) in the US, we would expect it to be 
equally applicable to buyout stage PE investors in the UK. Although some PE 
investors in UK buyouts entered the market as ‘captives’ with funds provided by their 
parents, the majority of them are independent or semi-captive and operate under the 
same system as US VCs.  Therefore, they too need to attract funds from external 
investors and need to establish their reputation by taking buyouts public. To test the 
applicability of the grandstanding theory in the UK buyout context, we form the 
following hypothesis.  
 
H5: Buyouts backed by young PEs go to IPO quicker than those backed by more 
experienced PEs. 
 
Another possible repercussion of grandstanding behaviour is that young PE firms may 
rush their portfolio firms to the market before they are ready and without the 
consideration of long term value creation. In comparison with seasoned PE investors, 
those that have newly entered the private equity market are clearly less skilled and 
experienced in the selection and monitoring of their portfolio firms. This, coupled 
with the pressure to grandstand, may mean that firms backed by young PE firms will 
experience much worse long term operating performance after IPO than those backed 
by seasoned ones. To date, no empirical studies have examined directly the long run 
operating performance of IPO firms backed by young PE investors. To test the impact 
of grandstanding behaviour in buyout firms’ performance in the UK, we form the 
following hypothesis. 
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H6: Buyouts backed by young PEs under-perform those backed by more experienced 
PEs after IPO. 
 
3. Data Description and Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 
Our sample of UK buyouts which exited through an IPO was collected from the 
Centre for Management Buyout Research (CMBOR) database at the University of 
Nottingham. The CMBOR database provides the most comprehensive coverage of all 
buyout type transactions in the UK and all size categories. There are 405 buyouts in 
total which went public through LSE, AIM, USM
7
 and EASDAQ between 1980 and 
1998. We use 1998 as the cut-off year to ensure that we can follow the operating 
performance of every sample firm for up to five years after their IPO. We exclude 
buyouts from the banking, insurance and finance sector and those without the relevant 
accounting data available for at least one of the three pre-IPO years and one of the 
five post-IPO years. This leaves a sample of 178 buyout IPOs, of which, 70% (125) 
are backed by PE investors. Table 1 reports the number of buyouts and IPOs in each 
year in the sample. Most of the buyouts in the sample took place between the mid-
1980s and the early-1990s, and the majority of IPOs cluster around either the late-
1980s or the mid-1990s when the stock market was fairly buoyant. 60% of the sample 
buyouts initially resulted from domestic and foreign divestment, 22% were from 
privately held firms and the rest were from firms in receivership, privatisation or 
secondary buyouts.  
 
[Table 1] 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the buyout sample. The median size of the 
initial buyout transactions is £11.5 million in terms of 1990 value. It takes on average 
between three and four years for a buyout to exit through an IPO, with a median exit 
time of 37.5 months. The firms in our sample appear to achieve remarkable growth in 
value during the buyout period, reflected in a much higher market valuation at the 
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 Unlisted Securities Market (USM) set up in 1980 to provide an easier route to the market for small or 
new companies. The market closed at the end of 1996. (USM companies could move to the main 
market or AIM.) 
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time of IPO. The median market capitalisation at IPO is £32.4 million. PE-backed 
buyouts are significantly larger than the non-PE-backed buyouts. They also exit much 
more quickly than non-PE-backed buyouts. Table 2 also shows that the buyouts in the 
sample experienced notable changes in their organisational structure as a result of 
IPO. In particular, both the level of leverage and the executive director’s share 
ownership declines significantly. The average pre-IPO leverage stands at 52%, which 
is relatively modest comparing with the level reported in some US studies on reverse 
LBOs
8
.   
 
[Table 2] 
 
The accounting data for the post IPO period is collected from Datastream. The 
relevant pre-IPO accounting data, the offer statistics and the information on changes 
of organisational structure was hand-collected from the IPO prospectus ordered 
through Companies House. The information about the PE investors involved is 
gleaned from a number of sources. For most of our PE-backed buyouts, the CMBOR 
database provides the names of the lead PE investors as well as the syndicated PE 
investors. The founding year of the PE firms is collected either through the BVCA 
website or directly from senior practitioners in the PE sector. 
 
We examine the operating performance of the 178 sample buyouts for the period of 
three years prior to IPO and five years after IPO. This choice of a relatively long 
window enables us to ascertain whether changes in performance are transitory or 
more long-lasting. Year -1 is the last full financial year immediately before the 
completion of the IPO and Year +1 is the first full financial year immediately after the 
completion of IPO. We do not include the performance in Year 0, i.e. the financial 
year during which the IPO takes place. This is because some buyouts may be 
operating as a private firm for most of the year 0, while others may have already 
completed the IPO and operated as a public corporation for most of the year. This 
potentially makes interpretation of the results for Year 0 difficult. As we do not 
require our sample firms to have accounting data available for the entire time window, 
the usable observations for different tests vary across each year.    
                                                
8
 For example, Holthausen and Larcker (1996) report a mean leverage of 83% for 
their sample of LBOs.  Their definition of the leverage is identical to ours.   
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3.2 Measurement of Operating Performance 
 
We adopt three accounting ratios to measure operating performance. These are cash 
flow to total assets (CF/TA), sales to total assets(S/TA) and cash flow to sales (CF/S).  
We use operating cash flow (CF) before interest and tax to avoid the mechanical 
effect of leverage on the results. We favour the CF measure as opposed to operating 
income as it is less susceptible to accounting manipulation. Direct cash flow data is 
only available through Datastream for the period after mid 1990. This is because the 
reporting of cash flow by the publicly traded firms has only been compulsory in the 
UK since 1992. As the IPOs in our sample took place both in the 1980s and the 
1990s, we had to choose a cash flow proxy that is available for all periods. Our cash 
flow measure is computed using net sales less cost of goods sold and selling, general 
and administrative expense before any depreciation depletion and amortisation which 
has been deducted.    
 
The CF/TA ratio has been used extensively in many past studies as a key measure of 
performance (for example Kaplan, 1989; Jain and Kini, 1994; Holthausen and Larker, 
1996), providing an indication of the level of returns on total assets. S/TA, also known 
as ‘asset turnover’, is a measure of a firm’s efficiency in asset utilisation. CF/S can be 
viewed as a profit margin measure. The fact that CF/TA is the product of asset 
turnover (S/TA) and margin (CF/S) enables us to discern whether the variation in 
return on assets is caused by changes in a firm’s effectiveness in asset utilisation or its 
ability to maintain or improve its margin. The use of asset-based ratios, however, may 
impose a downward bias in performance for the years immediately after the IPO. The 
completion of an IPO frequently leads to a sudden increase in a firms’ asset base. A 
decline in accounting ratios with total assets as denominator may occur without any 
real changes in performance taking place. 
 
We assess both the unadjusted and the industry-adjusted performance. The industry 
level performance is computed using the average cash flow, sales and total assets of 
the firms sharing the same Datastream Level 4 sector classification code with our 
sample firms. The industry adjustment is made by subtracting the contemporaneous 
industry level performance from each of the sample firms. As our sample buyouts 
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come from a broad range of sectors and exited through IPOs at different point of time, 
the industry adjustment allows us to control for both time period and industry effects.  
We use the Wilcoxon sign rank test to test whether industry adjusted performance is 
significantly different from zero. We also measure the change in operating 
performance as the median percentage change in the level of the performance measure 
(cash flow to total assets, asset turnover or cash flow to sales) against its level in Year 
-1. Instead of simply taking the difference of the ratios, we use the percentage change 
to measure the degree of change in performance. This makes cross sectional 
comparison more meaningful. We again use the Wilcoxon sign rank test to test 
whether the percentage change in the performance measure relative to Year -1 is 
significantly different from zero.  
 
3.3 Measurement of PE Influence 
 
To test the hypotheses related to PE investor involvement, we compare the operating 
performance between the different sample groups using Wilcoxon two sample test
9
. 
For the effect of PE backing, we test the difference in the median performance ratios 
between the PE-backed and the non-PE-backed groups. For the influence of PE 
investor reputation on buyout performance, we compare the median performance 
ratios between the group of buyouts with more prestigious PE firms as their lead 
investor and the group whose lead investors are not as prestigious. Similarly, to test 
the grandstanding hypothesis, we compare the differences in performance and the 
number of months for a buyout to achieve an IPO between the buyouts whose lead PE 
investment firms aged ten years or younger at the time of the buyout and those with 
more seasoned PE firms as their lead investor.    
 
We set the criterion for the reputable PE firms as the ones with at least 3% of total UK 
market share in terms of the number of buyout transactions backed between 1980 and 
1997. This is the approach adopted by Jelic et al.(2005) in their study of the market 
performance of a sample of buyout IPOs. Based on this criterion, we identify the same 
three top PE investors, namely 3i, NatWest Equity Partners and Barclays Private 
                                                
9
 We also conduct cross-sectional regression analysis to determine if differences in performance exist 
after controlling for other likely determinants of post-issue performance.  The control variables we 
include are Size (Market capitalisation at IPO), Offer size (% shares offered), Changes in leverage and 
Changes in executive directors’ share holding.   Our results are unaffected by the inclusion of these 
variables. 
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Equity. An alternative proxy for PE reputation is the number and size of PE funds 
raised by the PE investors. However, such data is not readily available in the UK. Our 
criterion for young PE has also been used in various other studies (Gompers, 1996; 
Barnes et al., 2003). Gompers defined young VC firms as those aged six years or 
under. They also tested eight and ten years as the cut-off for VC age but find that their 
results are unaffected. As the number of buyouts backed by PE investors in our study 
is not large, we choose ten years as our cut-off to ensure a reasonable sample size. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Buyout Performance  
 
Table 3 reports the median operating performance from the three years pre-IPO until 
five years post-IPO, and also the average operating performance over the pre-IPO and 
post-IPO periods. The first panel reports the median level of cash flow to total assets, 
the second panel reports the median asset turnover and the third panel reports the 
median cash flow to sales. In each case, the figures are reported both before and after 
industry adjustment. To facilitate the interpretation of our results, Figures 1-3 plot the 
three measures of operating performance both for the sample of buyout firms and for 
the industry average. From Panel A, we can see that median cash flow to total sales 
for buyout firms tends to rise in the three years before IPO reaching a peak at 20.82% 
in the year before IPO, but then falls steadily after IPO. In all years but one, buyout 
operating performance is significantly higher than the industry average. This 
difference also rises steadily in the three years before IPO, reaching a peak of 4.00% 
in the year immediately prior to IPO, but then falls steadily after IPO. By five years 
after IPO, cash flow to total assets for buyout firms is not significantly different from 
the industry average. These results are consistent with our hypotheses H1 and H2. In 
particular, it is apparent that buyout operating performance is higher than average 
before IPO, but steadily declines following IPO.  
 
We can identify the source of this pattern of operating performance in Panels B and C. 
Asset turnover (Panel B) is very significantly higher than average in every year, but 
falls almost monotonically from three years before IPO to five years after IPO. In 
contrast, cash flow to sales (Panel C) rises steadily for the three years pre-IPO and 
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declines steadily for the five years after IPO, but is actually lower than the industry 
average in all years except the one year either side of IPO. In no year is industry-
adjusted cash flow to sales significantly different from zero. Thus the high level of 
cash flow to total assets is accounted for by a very high level of asset turnover, which 
is partially offset by relatively low cash flow to sales. But the change in cash flow to 
total assets, relative to the industry average, is accounted cash flow to sales which 
rises steadily before IPO but declines steadily after IPO. The change in asset turnover 
offsets the rise in cash flow to sales before IPO but compounds the fall in cash flow to 
total assets after IPO, leading to a large decline in operating performance.  
 
[Table 3] 
 
[Figures 1-3] 
 
Table 4 presents the median percentage change in operating performance relative to 
Year -1 for each of the performance measures, both with and without industry 
adjustment. Here we can clearly see the dynamics of operating performance over the 
pre-IPO and post-IPO periods. Three years before IPO, cash flow to total assets (Panel 
A) is more than 20 percent lower than its Year -1 level before industry adjustment, 
and more than 40 percent lower after industry adjustment. After IPO, operating 
performance steadily declines, reaching 31 percent below its Year -1 level before 
industry adjustment and 68 percent below it after industry adjustment. Even for the 
first year after IPO, there is a statistically significant reduction in adjusted operating 
performance. There is no significant change in asset turnover pre-IPO (Panel B), but a 
very significant decline relative to the Year -1 level post-IPO. Cash flow to sales 
(Panel C) in almost all cases, both pre-IPO and post-IPO, is very significantly lower 
than the Year -1 level.  
 
[Table 4] 
 
4.2 The Role of Private Equity Investors  
 
Table 5 reports the three measures of operating performance for the two sub-groups of 
buyout IPOs that were PE-backed and not PE-backed, respectively. Operating 
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performance is reported both in absolute terms, and relative to average industry 
performance. In terms of cash flow to assets (Panel A), PE-backed and non-PE-
backed buyouts both display a similar pattern of operating performance. Prior to IPO, 
PE-backed buyouts marginally outperform non-PE-backed buyouts, in both absolute 
terms and industry-adjusted terms, while after IPO, non-PE-backed buyouts 
marginally outperform PE-backed buyouts. However, in no year is the difference 
between the two groups statistically significant. 
 
In terms of asset turnover (Panel B), Non-PE-backed buyouts tend to outperform PE-
backed buyouts up until two years before IPO and following three years after IPO. 
But for the period immediately before and after IPO, PE-backed buyouts outperform 
non-PE-backed buyouts, although the differences are not statistically significant. In 
terms of industry relative performance, PE-backed buyouts outperform non-PE-
backed buyouts for the entire post-IPO period. In terms of cash flow to sales (Panel 
C), the converse situation arises: PE-backed buyouts outperform non-PE-backed 
buyouts before IPO but non-PE-backed buyouts outperform PE-backed buyouts after 
IPO. Again, however, the differences are insignificant. Our results therefore tend to 
support our hypothesis H3 that PE investor involvement has no impact on the 
operating performance of buyout LBOs. These results are consistent with Espenlaub 
et al. (1999) and Rinderman (2003) who find a similar result for UK and European 
IPOs of non-buyout firms. 
 
[Table 5] 
 
Table 6 presents the median percentage change in operating performance relative to 
Year -1 for PE-backed and non-PE-backed buyouts. The p-values (reported in 
parentheses) test the null hypothesis that the percentage change relative to Year -1 is 
the same for the PE-backed and non-PE-backed groups. From Panel A, it can be seen 
that while both groups experience considerable underperformance relative to Year -1 
in both the pre-IPO and post-IPO periods, the degree of underperformance is more 
extreme for the PE-backed buyouts. This is particularly evident after adjusting for 
industry average performance: Year -3 performance is 49.65% below Year -1 
performance for PE-backed buyouts, but only 1.47% below Year -1 performance for 
non-PE-backed buyouts. The same is true for other years in the sample, but the 
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difference declines towards the end of the post-IPO period. Only for Year -3 and Year 
+1 is the difference between the PE-backed and non-PE-backed buyouts statistically 
significant. 
 
[Table 6] 
 
4.3 PE Investor Reputation 
 
Table 7 reports the three measures of operating performance for the two sub-groups of 
buyout IPOs that were backed by the top three PE firms and by other PE firms, 
respectively. In terms of cash flow to assets (Panel A), buyouts backed by one of the 
top three PE firms tend to perform better than those backed by less prestigious PE 
firms in all years from three years pre-IPO to four years post-IPO. Only in the last 
year – five years post-IPO – do buyouts backed by the top three PE firms perform 
worse than those backed by other PE firms, and the difference is relatively small. The 
picture is similar in terms of industry adjusted performance although there are two 
years in which buyouts backed by the top three PE firms perform worse than those 
backed by other PE firms (Year -1 and Year +2). Buyouts backed by the top three PE 
firms also perform better in almost all years in terms asset turnover (Panel B). 
However, they perform very markedly worse in terms of cash flow to sales (Panel C). 
These results confirm our hypothesis H4, that buyouts backed by prestigious PE firms 
tend to perform better than those backed by less prestigious PE firms. However, the 
results suggest that the source of this performance gain is in asset turnover, not cash 
flow. 
 
[Table 7] 
 
Table 8 reports the median percentage change in operating performance relative to 
Year -1 for the buyouts backed the three top PE firms and those backed by the less 
prestigious PEs.  On the whole, both groups experience negative changes in their 
performance relative to the Year -1 level.  Although not statistically significant, the 
decline experienced by the top three PE backed buyouts appear to be more moderate 
than that by the other group except in the case of industry adjusted asset turnover in 
Year +1, +3 and +4.   In terms of the overall return on assets, the top three PE backed 
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buyouts experience a significantly smaller decline relative to the group of other PE 
backed buy-outs in the first three years after the IPO.  However, there is no marked 
difference between the degree of changes in the two groups towards the end of period.  
Our results suggest that buyouts backed by three top PE firms are better at 
maintaining their pre-IPO level of performance in the first three years after the IPO.  
As most PE firms should have completed their exit at the end of Year +3, it is not 
surprising no significant differences are found in Year +4 and +5. 
[Table 8] 
 
4.4 PE Investor Grandstanding 
 
Table 9 reports the three measures of operating performance for the two sub-groups of 
buyout IPOs that were backed by young PE firms and other PE firms, respectively. 
On average, cash flow to assets for the buyouts backed by young PE firms is lower 
than those backed by other PE firms, both for the three years before IPO and the five 
years after IPO, although there is considerable variation within each period. Buyouts 
backed by young PE firms tend to do particularly badly immediately following IPO, 
but the difference subsequently narrows, and by five years after IPO, they are 
outperforming buyouts that were backed by other PE firms. The underperformance of 
buyouts backed by young PE firms is evident both in terms of absolute performance 
and industry-adjusted performance. The results are therefore consistent with our 
hypothesis H6, that buyouts backed by young PE firms tend to perform worse than 
those backed by other, more experienced PE firms, after IPO. From Panels B and C, 
we can identify the source of this underperformance. Industry-adjusted asset turnover 
(Panel B) is lower for buyouts backed by young PE firms for the entire pre-IPO 
period, but after IPO, asset turnover tends to be higher for this group. In contrast, 
industry-adjusted cash flow to sales is higher for buyouts backed by young PE firms 
during the pre-IPO period, but uniformly lower in the post-IPO period. Thus, young 
PE firms contribute less to the post-IPO performance of the firms that they back 
because they generate lower cash flow to sales, despite generating higher asset 
turnover.  
 
[Table 9] 
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Table 10 reports the median percentage change in operating performance relative to 
Year -1 for the buyouts backed young PE firms and those backed by the more 
seasoned PE firms. The young PE backed group appears to experience a smaller 
decline in asset turnover in most of the post-IPO years and the difference is 
particularly significant in Year +1 and Year +4. However, the better relative 
performance in asset turnover is more than offset by a marked decline in cash flow to 
sales.  In all but Year +5, the young PE-backed group performance deteriorates at a 
greater rate than the other PE-backed group and the differences are statistically 
significant at least at the 5% level.   As a result, the young PE backed buyouts appear 
to experience far more pronounced decline in their return on assets in the post IPO 
years, although the differences are less marked after Year +3. 
 
[Table 10] 
 
Table 11 reports statistics on the number of months from buyout to IPO. For young 
PE-backed buyouts, the median time to IPO is 27.5 months, compared to 35 months 
for other PE-backed buyouts, and 39 months for all other PE-backed and non-PE-
backed buyouts. The difference between the young PE-backed and other PE-backed 
buyouts, while consistent with our hypothesis H5 that buyouts backed by young PE 
firms go to IPO quicker than those backed by more experienced PE firms, is not 
significant statistically. However, the median time to IPO for young PE-backed 
buyouts is significantly shorter than the median time to IPO for all PE-backed and 
non-PE-backed buyouts. 
 
[Table 11] 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this paper we evaluate the operating performance of buyout firms that exit through 
IPOs using a sample of 178 UK companies over the period 1980-1998. In particular, 
we consider the operating performance of buyout firms, measured by cash flow to 
total assets, asset turnover and cash flow to sales, from three years before IPO to five 
years following IPO. We find that buyout firms produce higher than industry average 
performance as measured by cash flow to total assets in both pre-IPO and post-IPO 
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periods. This performance seems to be achieved through a better ability to utilise the 
asset base to generate sales rather than through higher margin. This is consistent with 
the industry anecdotal evidence that buy-out firms commonly spin off non-performing 
or peripheral businesses and are able to operate on a very ‘lean’ asset base. Their 
inability to generate more attractive margin than the industry average level loosely 
suggest that they are not particularly strong in terms of cost reduction or the 
development of premium products. 
 
Buy-out firms generally experience remarkable improvement in their performance in 
the three years before IPO. The performance reaches its peak in Y-1 (the financial 
year immediate before the completion of the IPO).  Such performance, however, 
appear to be unsustainable. When compared with the Y-1 level of performance, buy-
outs experience marked decline in cash flow to total assets in the five years post IPO.  
The decline seems to be caused by the deterioration in both asset turnover and margin.  
The finding is in line with both Jain and Kini (1994) on the post IPO operating 
performance of a sample of US non-buy-out IPOs, and Holthausan and Larker (1996) 
on the performance of US reverse LBOs.   
 
We go on to investigate the role of PE providers in the operating performance of 
buyout IPOs. In contrast with evidence for US venture capital backed non-buyout 
IPOs, we find no significant difference in pre-IPO or post-IPO operating performance 
between PE-backed and non-PE-backed buyouts. However, there is weak evidence 
that buyouts backed by the three leading PE firms in the UK experience a relatively 
smaller decline in their post IPO performance. Buy-outs backed by young PE firms do 
appear to take their portfolio buyouts to market much quicker than the more seasoned 
PE firms although the result is not highly significant. Firms backed by young PE 
firms do not perform significantly differently from other PE firms overall, but it 
appears that they experience a more severe decline in margin but a less drastic 
reduction in asset turnover in the post IPO period. 
 25
References 
 
Burgel, O., 2000.  Venture Capital and Private Equity as an Asset Class for 
Institutional Investors.  BVCA. 
 
Brav, A. & Gompers, P.A., 1997.  Myth or reality?  The long-run underperformance 
of initial public offerings: evidence from venture and nonventure capital-backed 
companies.  The Journal of Finance, Vol. 52 No. 5. P1791-1821. 
 
Bruton, G.D., Keels, J.K. & Scifres, E.L., 2002.  Corporate restructuring and 
performance: an agency perspective on the complete buyout cycle.  Journal of 
Business Research.  Vol.55 P709-724. 
 
The Centre for Management Buy-out Research (CMBOR).  Quarterly Review.  
Winter 2003/2004 
 
Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2004.  Making the break – A practical guide to MBOs.  
London 
 
Degeorge, F & Zeckhauser, R., 1993.  The reverse LBO decision and firm 
performance: theory and evidence.  The Journal of Finance.  Vol.48, No.4 P1323-
1348. 
 
Espenlaub, S., Garrett, I. and Mun, W.P., 1999.  Conflicts of interest and the 
performance of venture-capital-backed IPOs: a preliminary look at the UK.  Venture 
Capital.  Vol.1 No.4, 325-349 
 
Espenlaub, S., Gorergen, M. and Khurshed, A., 2001.  IPO lock-in agreements in the 
UK.  Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 28 (9) & (10) 1235-1278 
 
EVCA, 2005. “Investment Benchmarks 2005 European Private Equity.” EVCA & 
Thomson Venture Economics, www.evca.com. 
 
Gompers, P., 1996.  Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry.  Journal of 
Financial Economics.  Vol. 43 P133-156. 
 
Green, S., 1992.  The impact of ownership and capital structure on managerial 
motivation and strategy in management buy-outs: a cultural analysis.  Journal of 
Management Studies.  24 (9) P 513-535 
 
Hege, U., Palomino, F. and Schwienbacher, A., 2003.  Determinants of venture capital 
performance: Europe and the United States.  Working paper No.001, RICAFE – Risk 
Capital and the Financing of European Innovative Firms. 
 
Holthausen, R.W. & Larcker, D.F., 1996.  The financial performance of reverse 
leveraged buyouts.  Journal of Financial Economics.  Vol.42 P293-332 
 
Jain, B. & Kini, O., 1994.  The post-issue operating performance of IPO firms.  The 
Journal of Finance.  P 1699-1726. 
 
 26
Jain, B. & Kini, O., 1995.  Venture Capitalist participation and the post-issue 
operating performance of IPO firms.  Managerial and Decision Economics.  Vol.16 
P593-606 
 
Jelic, R., Saadouni, B. & Wright, M., 2005.  Performance of private to public MBOs: 
the role of venture capital.  Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. Vol.32 
No.¾ P643-682 
 
Jensen, M.C., 1989.  The eclipse of the public corporation.  Harvard Business Review, 
Sept – Oct., 1989. 
 
Kaplan, S., 1989.  The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and 
value.  Journal of financial economics.  Vol. 24 P217-254 
 
Kaplan, S., 1991.  The staying power of leveraged buy-outs.  Journal of Financial 
Economics. 29, 287-313. 
 
Landier, A. (2001).  Start-up financing: Banks vs. venture capital.  Mimeo, MIT. 
 
Loughran, T., Ritter, J.R. and Rydqvist, K., 1994.  Initial Public Offerings: 
International Insights.  Pacific Basin Finance Journal.  Vol. 2.  P165-199 
 
Manigart, S., De Waele, K., Wright, M., Robbie, K., Sapienza, H. and Beekman, A., 
2002.  Determinants of required return in venture capital investments: A five country 
study.  Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 17(4), P.291-312. 
 
Mikkelson, W.H., Partch, M.M. and Shah, K., 1997.  Ownership and operating 
performance of companies that go public.  Journal of Financial Economics.  Vol. 44 
P281-207 
 
Muscarella, C.J. & Vetsuypens, M.R., 1990.  Efficiency and organisational structure: 
A study of reverse LBOs.  The Journal of Finance.  Vol. XLV No.5. 
 
Phan, P. & Hill, C., 1995. Organisational restructuring and economic performance in 
leveraged buy-outs: An ex post study.  Academy of Management Journal. 38 (3) P 
704-739 
 
Rindermann, G.,  2003.   Venture Capitalist participation and the performance of IPO 
firms.  Empirical evidence from France, Germany and the UK.  European University 
Studies.  Series V: Economics and Management.  Vol.3029 
 
Ritter, J.R., 1991.  The long-run performance of initial public offerings.  Journal of 
Finance.  Vol. 46. P3-27.  
 
Rosenstein, J., Bruno, A., Bygrave, W. and Taylor, N., 1993.  The CEO, venture 
capitalists, and the board.  Journal of Business Venturing.  Vol. 8.  P 99-113 
 
Sahlman, W.A., 1990.  The structure and governance of venture-capital organisations.  
Journal of Financial Economics.  27.  P 473-521 
 
 27
Sapienza, H., 1992.  When do Venture Capitalists add value? Journal of Business 
Venturing.  Vol.7.  P9-27 
 
Sapienza, H. and Gupta, A., 1994.  Impact of agency risks and task uncertainty on 
venture capitalist-CEO interaction.  Academy of management journal.  Vol.37. No. 6.  
P1618 - 1632 
 
Sapienza, H., Amason, A. and Manigart, S., 1994.  The level and nature of venture 
capitalists involvement in their portfolio companies: a study of three European 
countries.  Managerial Finance, Vol. 20, P3-17 
 
Singh, H., 1990.  Management buy-outs and shareholder value.  Strategic 
Management Journal.  Vol.11 P111-129 
 
Smith, A.J., 1990.  Corporate ownership structure and performance: the case of 
management buyouts. Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 27 P143–164. 
 
Timmons, J. & Bygrave, W., 1986.  Venture Capital’s role in financing innovation for 
economic growth.  Journal of business venturing.  Vol.1 P161-176 
 
Wright, M., Hoskisson, R.E., Busenitz, L.W. & Dial, J., 2001.  Finance and 
management buyouts: agency versus entrepreneurship perspectives.  Venture Capital.  
Vol.3 No.3 P239-261. 
 
Wright, M., Thompson, S. & Robbie, K., 1992. Venture capital and management-led 
leverage buy-outs: European evidence.  Journal of Business Venturing. 7(1) P47-71 
 
Wright, M., Thompson, S., Robbie, K. and Wong, P., 1995.  Management Buy-outs in 
the short and long term.  Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. 22 (40) 
 
Wright, M. & Wilson, N., 1996.  The longer-term effects of management-led buy-
outs.  Journal of Entrepreneurial & Small Business Finance.  Vol.5 Issue 3 
 
Zahra, S.A., 1995.  Corporate entrepreneurship and financial performance: the case of 
management leveraged buyouts.  Journal of Business Venturing.  Vol.10 P225-247 
 
 28
 
Table 1: Buyout/IPO Year Distribution 
Year  
No. of 
buyouts PE-backed 
Non-PE-
backed  
No. of 
IPO 
exits 
Pre 1980 3 1 2 - 
1980 4 - 4 - 
1981 3 - 3 - 
1982 1 - 1 - 
1983 2 1 1 - 
1984 6 2 4 2 
1985 5 4 1 7 
1986 7 7 - 14 
1987 10 9 1 12 
1988 7 7 - 20 
1989 11 10 1 5 
1990 14 12 2 2 
1991 11 9 2 0 
1992 7 6 1 8 
1993 9 8 1 16 
1994 3 2 1 26 
1995 3 3 - 15 
1996 - - - 27 
1997 3 2 1 19 
1998 - - - 5 
Missing 69 42 27 - 
Total 178 125 53 178 
 
  
Table 2: Sample Descriptive Statistics       
Buyout value is a value of buyout transacton in million of GBP in 1990 value;  Market Value at IPO is market capitalisation in millions of GBP in 1990 value; 
Time from buyouts to IPO is the number of months from buyout transaction to listing;  Executive director's shareholding is the total number of beneficial common 
equity held by the executive directors as a percentage of the total number of common equity of the firm.   Leverage is measured by the book value of total debt 
divided by the book value of the total assets. 
Variable Median Mean Min Max St. Dev. Observations 
Buyout value 11.5 55.7 0.2 2361.5 214.7 142 
Buyout value - PE-backed 18.1 69.5 0.3 2361.5 241.2 111 
Buyout value - non-PE-backed 4.3 6.3 0.2 47.7 8.8 31 
Market Value at IPO 32.4 57.1 4.1 609.3 77.1 171 
Market Value at IPO - PE-backed 40.6 71.2 4.1 609.3 87.1 120 
Market Value at IPO - non-PE-backed 17.4 24.1 4.2 159.3 24.2 51 
Time from buyout to IPO 37.5 45.7 4.0 183.0 31.5 172 
Time from buyout to IPO - PE-backed 33.0 41.3 4.0 114.0 27.6 121 
Time from buyout to IPO - non-PE-backed 51.0 56.1 4.0 183.0 37.5 51 
Executive Directors' Share holding %        
Pre-IPO 25.0 34.7 0.2 100.0 28.7 97 
Post-IPO 15.5 20.7 0.0 78.2 18.7 113 
Change -8.7 -13.1 -76.2 6.7 13.2 97 
Leverage % (Total debt to Total Assets)        
Pre-IPO 35.6 51.7 0.0 499.5 66.7 124 
Post-IPO 13.0 16.1 0.0 75.5 15.9 159 
Change -16.4 -34.1 -443.9 54.3 63.1 121 
Table 3:  Median Operating Performance  
Cash flow equals net sales less cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expense before depreciation depletion and amortisation.  Asset Turnover equals total sales 
to total assets.   Year -1 is the last full financial year immediately before the IPO completion year and Year +1 is the first full financial year immediately after the IPO completion 
year.  Year -3, Year -2, Year +2 to Year +5 work on the same principle.  3 Year Avg and 5 Year Avg refer to the mean performance of the first three years and the five years after 
IPO respectively. Industry performance is computed by using the industry average of the relevant accounting items.  industry adjustment is made by subtracting the matched industry 
performance from the performance of each sample firm.  The industry performance is matched by year and by Datastream sector classificification level 4 code.   The significance 
levels reported for industry adjusted performance are based on the Wilcoxon matched sample test. 
Year Relative to the Completion of IPO Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year +1 Year +2 Year +3 Year +4 Year +5 
3 Year 
Avg 
5 Year 
Avg 
Panel A: Cash Flow to Total Assets 
Before industry adjustment 0.1834 0.1741 0.2082 0.1934 0.1881 0.1788 0.1681 0.1565 0.1942 0.1878 
After industry adjustment  0.0173c 0.0340a 0.0557a 0.0400a 0.0222a 0.0328a 0.0245a 0.0047 0.0322a 0.0283a 
Observations 96 100 113 127 132 133 127 124 116 98 
Panel B: Asset Turnover 
Before industry adjustment 1.7605 1.7227 1.6869 1.4916 1.5359 1.4441 1.3832 1.3915 1.5513 1.5712 
After industry adjustment  0.5359a 0.5300a 0.4806a 0.3565a 0.3062a 0.3781a 0.3455a 0.3211a 0.3480a 0.4236a 
Observations 105 108 122 159 163 159 140 132 144 120 
Panel C: Cash Flow to Sales 
Before industry adjustment 0.0950 0.1207 0.1436 0.1529 0.1388 0.1359 0.1230 0.1193 0.1404 0.1424 
After industry adjustment  -0.0279 -0.0056 0.0135 0.0004 -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.0139 -0.0226 0.0003 -0.0107 
Observations 104 109 117 129 135 135 129 126 118 100 
a
 Significantly different from zero at 0.01 level (Two tailed test). 
b
 Significantly different from zero at 0.05 level (Two tailed test). 
c
 Significantly different from zero at 0.10 level (Two tailed test). 
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Table 4: Median Percentage Change in Operating Performance Relative to Year -1 
Cash Flow equals net sales less cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expense before depreciation depletion and amortisation. Asset Turnover equals total 
sales to total assets.   Year -1 is the last full financial year immediately before the IPO completion year and Year +1 is the first full financial year immediately after the IPO 
completion year.  3 Year Avg and 5 Year Avg refer to the mean performance of the first three years and the five years after IPO respectively.  Industry performance is 
computed by using the industry average of the relevant accounting items.  industry adjustment is made by subtracting the matched industry performance from the performance 
of each sample firm. The % change is computed by subtracting Year -3 level of performance from each year's performance and then dividing the difference by the year-3 
level.  The significance levels reported are based on the Wilcoxon one sample test. 
Year Relative to Completion of 
IPO 
Year -2 
relative to 
Year -3 
Year -1 
relative to 
Year -3 
Year +1 
relative to 
Year -3 
Year +2 
relative to 
Year -3 
Year +3 
relative to 
Year -3 
Year +4 
relative to 
Year -3 
Year +5 
relative to 
Year -3 
3 Year 
Avg to 
Year -3 
5 Year Avg 
to Year -3 
Panel A: Percentage Change in Cash Flow to Total Assets 
% change before industry adjustment 4.81% 20.60%a 8.77%b 20.14%b 6.90%c 10.15%b -8.24% 8.11%b 6.12%c 
% change after industry adjustment 13.06% 20.30%b -17.34% -14.52% -35.58% -23.85% -28.99% -14.09% -6.12% 
Observations 49 49 36 35 37 31 32 33 30 
Panel B: Percentage Change in Assets Turnover 
% change before industry adjustment 2.12% 1.44% -6.74%
b
 -10.17%
b
 -11.62%
c
 -9.04% -15.17% -12.72%
b
 -12.1283% 
% change after industry adjustment 2.77% -5.74% -36.35%b -35.12%b -35.69%c -14.23% -18.41% -37.99%c -27.03% 
Observations 52 53 50 51 48 40 37 45 35 
Panel C: Percentage Change in Cash Flow to Sales 
% change before industry adjustment 8.67%a 20.57%a 28.24%a 31.39%a 20.97%a 26.94%a 18.48%b 26.26%a 24.25%b 
% change after industry adjustment 12.15%c 24.48%b -1.51% 6.58% 11.61% 14.73% 4.81% 14.00% 3.43% 
Observations 52 52 39 38 40 34 35 35 31 
a
 Significantly different from zero at 0.01 level (Two tailed test). 
b
 Significantly different from zero at 0.05 level (Two tailed test). 
c
 Significantly different from zero at 0.10 level (Two tailed test). 
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Table 5:  Median Operating Performance - PE backed vs. Non-PE backed buy-outs 
Cash Flow equals net sales less cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expense before depreciation depletion and amortisation.  Asset Turnover equals 
total sales to total assets.   Year -1 is the last full financial year immediately before the IPO completion year and Year +1 is the first full financial year immediately after the 
IPO completion year.  3 Year Avg and 5 Year Avg refer to the mean performance of the first three years and the five years after IPO respectively.  Industry performance is 
computed by using the industry average of the relevant accounting items.  industry adjustment is made by subtracting the matched industry performance from the 
performance of each sample firm.  
Year Relative to Completion of IPO Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year +1 Year +2 Year +3 Year +4 Year +5 
3 Year 
Avg 
5 Year 
Avg 
Panel A: Cash Flow to Total Assets                     
Pre-ind. adjustment: PE backed  0.1676 0.1907 0.2205 0.1831 0.1812 0.1753 0.1641 0.1537 0.1793 0.1806 
 Non-PE backed 0.1447 0.1452 0.1892 0.2231 0.2027 0.1854 0.1702 0.1630 0.2469 0.2067 
Post-ind. adjustment: PE backed  0.0193 0.0351 0.0655 0.0334 0.0148 0.0321 0.0227 -0.0040 0.0279 0.0239 
 Non-PE backed -0.0075 0.0329 0.0371 0.0478 0.0480 0.0430 0.0226 0.0084 0.0604 0.0475 
Observations PE backed  76 79 90 92 92 88 82 82 83 68 
 Non-PE backed 20 21 23 35 40 44 44 41 33 30 
Panel B: Assets Turnover           
Pre-ind. adjustment: PE backed  1.7605 1.6960 1.7395 1.5452 1.6188 1.4482 1.3898 1.3915 1.6346 1.5754 
 Non-PE backed 1.8002 1.9007 1.5143 1.4582 1.4116 1.4397 1.4354 1.4450 1.4479 1.5321 
Post-ind. adjustment: PE backed  0.5208 0.4754 0.5139 0.3623 0.3150 0.3943 0.3842 0.3352 0.4128 0.4503 
 Non-PE backed 0.5965 0.6438 0.3424 0.2037 0.2584 0.2423 0.3045 0.3117 0.2135 0.2558 
Observations PE backed  82 84 94 116 117 111 97 91 104 86 
 Non-PE backed 24 25 29 45 49 50 46 43 42 36 
Panel C: Cash Flow to Sales           
Pre-ind. adjustment: PE backed  0.1033 0.1240 0.1490 0.1495 0.1388 0.1328 0.1192 0.1128 0.1382 0.1356 
 Non-PE backed 0.0880 0.1107 0.1137 0.1636 0.1384 0.1374 0.1330 0.1294 0.1490 0.1489 
Post-ind. adjustment: PE backed  -0.0243 -0.0079 0.0187 0.0004 -0.0060 -0.0071 -0.0196 -0.0249 -0.0065 -0.0181 
 Non-PE backed -0.0344 0.0042 -0.0080 0.0004 -0.0053 -0.0056 -0.0063 -0.0158 0.0134 -0.0048 
Observations PE backed  78 81 91 93 93 89 83 83 84 69 
  Non-PE backed 24 25 26 36 42 45 45 42 34 31 
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Table 6: Percentage Change in Operating Performance - PE-backed vs. Non-PE-backed Buyouts 
Cash Flow equals net sales less cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expense before depreciation depletion and amortisation.  Asset Turnover equals total 
sales to total assets.   Year -1 is the last full financial year immediately before the IPO completion year and Year +1 is the first full financial year immediately after the IPO 
completion year.  3 Year Avg and 5 Year Avg refer to the mean performance of the first three years and the five years after IPO respectively.  Industry performance is 
computed by using the industry average of the relevant accounting items.  industry adjustment is made by subtracting the matched industry performance from the performance 
of each sample firm. The % change is computed by subtracting Year -1 level of performance from each year's performance and dividing the difference by the year-1 level.  
The p-values reported are based on the Wilcoxon two sample difference test (two tailed). 
Year Relative to 
Completion of IPO   
Year -3 to 
Year -1 
Year -2 to 
Year -1 
Year +1 
to Year -1 
Year +2 
to Year -1 
Year +3 
to Year -1 
Year +4 
to Year -1 
Year +5 
to Year -1 
3 Year Avg 
to Year -1 
5 Year Avg to 
Year -1 
Panel A: Percentage Change in Cash Flow to Total Assets 
Pre-ind. adjustment: PE-backed  -22.65% -13.97% -5.91% -10.80% -13.45% -21.93% -31.13% -11.12% -17.72% 
 Non-PE-backed -13.97% -10.54% 7.12% -3.22% -3.57% -16.84% -20.89% 2.17% -13.04% 
 p-value [0.2302] [0.3205] [0.1003] [0.9488] [0.4597] [0.4287] [0.6071] [0.2373] [0.6771] 
Post-ind. adjustment: PE-backed  -49.65% -26.26% -30.89% -35.88% -42.47% -51.09% -69.10% -34.89% -39.73% 
 Non-PE-backed -1.47% -5.36% 18.02% -26.64% -38.59% -80.39% -66.82% -18.73% -36.13% 
 p-value [0.0824] [0.3279] [0.0902] [0.4138] [0.4374] [0.9162] [0.606] [0.2863] [0.9869] 
Panel B: Percentage Change in Assets Turnover 
Pre-ind. adjustment: PE-backed  -3.86% -2.44% -8.29% -11.92% -11.32% -12.26% -16.58% -8.99% -12.69% 
 Non-PE-backed 3.05% 3.30% -16.07% -17.44% -14.37% -12.21% -5.28% -13.85% -8.01% 
 p-value [0.1909] [0.0464] [0.3371] [0.1592] [0.3716] [0.7926] [0.4358] [0.4312] [0.7437] 
Post-ind. adjustment: PE-backed  -8.60% -4.69% -32.75% -31.30% -30.82% -34.52% -38.22% -28.84% -31.05% 
 Non-PE-backed 22.72% 21.01% -26.78% -33.06% -13.11% -10.18% -5.19% -22.14% -16.00% 
 p-value [0.0308] [0.0267] [0.9645] [0.7053] [0.949] [0.5311] [0.2882] [0.8643] [0.8597] 
Panel C: Percentage Change in Cash Flow to Sales 
Pre-ind. adjustment: PE-backed  -19.79% -11.70% 3.37% -0.60% -0.35% -6.25% -10.17% -1.57% -5.58% 
  Non-PE-backed -23.93% -11.44% 3.16% 6.47% -1.30% -7.65% -23.27% 2.94% -13.06% 
  p-value [0.7556] [0.5045] [0.2895] [0.6592] [0.7894] [0.8891] [0.342] [0.5589] [0.9304] 
Post-ind. adjustment: PE-backed  -44.21% -21.19% -1.05% -17.72% -16.58% -26.02% -44.74% -8.38% -16.47% 
  Non-PE-backed -18.92% -11.41% -20.51% -2.03% -17.98% -47.37% -59.31% -15.34% -12.23% 
  p-value [0.1815] [0.2384] [0.5283] [0.6358] [0.5822] [0.4734] [0.8664] [0.8722] [0.714] 
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Table 7: Median Operating Performance - Buyouts Backed by Top Three PE Firms vs. Buyouts Backed by Other PE Firms 
Cash Flow equals net sales less cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expense before depreciation depletion and amortisation.  Asset Turnover equals 
total sales to total assets.   Year -1 is the last full financial year immediately before the IPO completion year and Year +1 is the first full financial year immediately after 
the IPO completion year.  3 Year Avg and 5 Year Avg refer to the mean performance of the first three years and the five years after IPO respectively.  Industry 
performance is computed by using the industry average of the relevant accounting items.  industry adjustment is made by subtracting the matched industry performance 
from the performance of each sample firm. Top Top 3 PE investors refer to the 3 PE firms which backed the largest number of buy-outs from 1980 to 1998. 
Year Relative to Completion of IPO Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year +1 Year +2 Year +3 Year +4 Year +5 
3 Year 
Avg 
5 Year 
Avg 
Panel A: Cash Flow to Total Assets                     
Pre-ind. adjustment: Top 3 PE backed  0.1822 0.1852 0.2250 0.2101 0.2122 0.1938 0.1913 0.1370 0.2047 0.1936 
 Other PE backed 0.1487 0.1795 0.2165 0.1711 0.1709 0.1659 0.1641 0.1537 0.1637 0.1676 
Post-ind. adjustment: Top 3 PE backed  0.0159 0.0405 0.0619 0.0552 0.0459 0.0463 0.0461 0.0013 0.0480 0.0287 
 Other PE backed 0.0133 0.0250 0.0661 0.0189 0.0069 0.0120 0.0044 -0.0021 0.0070 0.0133 
Observations Top 3 PE backed  27 29 33 27 28 28 26 25 26 23 
 Other PE backed 38 39 46 41 39 39 34 34 39 29 
Panel B: Assets Turnover           
Pre-ind. adjustment: Top 3 PE backed  1.8569 1.6709 1.7275 1.6872 1.6915 1.6302 1.5003 1.4541 1.7319 1.6502 
 Other PE backed 1.7424 1.7031 1.7316 1.5472 1.5894 1.3922 1.4013 1.3973 1.6488 1.5774 
Post-ind. adjustment: Top 3 PE backed  0.7043 0.4687 0.4834 0.3696 0.4076 0.4081 0.4170 0.5269 0.4886 0.4422 
 Other PE backed 0.3742 0.5043 0.5294 0.2599 0.2643 0.3299 0.3078 0.2465 0.3770 0.4577 
Observations Top 3 PE backed  27 29 33 33 32 31 28 27 30 26 
 Other PE backed 42 42 49 48 47 46 40 36 46 36 
Panel C: Cash Flow to Sales           
Pre-ind. adjustment: Top 3 PE backed  0.0937 0.1120 0.1396 0.1335 0.1373 0.1116 0.1145 0.0992 0.1297 0.1101 
 Other PE backed 0.1000 0.1318 0.1562 0.1510 0.1399 0.1383 0.1156 0.1254 0.1404 0.1440 
Post-ind. adjustment: Top 3 PE backed  -0.0362 -0.0094 0.0016 -0.0085 -0.0220 -0.0164 -0.0240 -0.0287 -0.0083 -0.0262 
 Other PE backed -0.0207 0.0048 0.0270 0.0186 0.0062 -0.0004 -0.0153 -0.0198 0.0052 -0.0037 
Observations Top 3 PE backed  27 29 33 30 30 29 27 26 29 26 
  Other PE backed 40 41 48 41 40 40 35 35 40 30 
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Table 8: Percentage Change in Operating Performance - Buyouts Backed by Top Three PE Firms vs. Buyouts Backed by Other PE Firms 
Cash Flow equals net sales less cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expense before depreciation depletion and amortisation.  Asset Turnover equals total 
sales to total assets.   Year -1 is the last full financial year immediately before the IPO completion year and Year +1 is the first full financial year immediately after the IPO 
completion year.  3 Year Avg and 5 Year Avg refer to the mean performance of the first three years and the five years after IPO respectively.  Industry performance is 
computed by using the industry average of the relevant accounting items.  industry adjustment is made by subtracting the matched industry performance from the performance 
of each sample firm. The % change is computed by subtracting Year -1 level of performance from each year's performance and dividing the difference by the year-1 level.  
Top 3 PE firms are identified based on the total number of buyouts they backed from 1980 to 1997.  The p-values reported are based on the Wilcoxon two sample difference 
test (two tailed). 
Year Relative to 
Completion of IPO   
Year -3 to 
Year -1 
Year -2 to 
Year -1 
Year +1 
to Year -1 
Year +2 
to Year -1 
Year +3 
to Year -1 
Year +4 
to Year -1 
Year +5 
to Year -1 
3 Year Avg to 
Year -1 
5 Year Avg to 
Year -1 
Panel A: Percentage Change in Cash Flow to Total Assets 
Pre-ind. adjustment: Top 3 PE-backed -20.07% -16.48% -1.75% 5.11% -2.94% -21.05% -23.77% -2.18% -11.46% 
 Other PE-backed -26.18% -13.97% -9.56% -17.49% -26.49% -22.97% -34.55% -21.80% -25.98% 
 p-value [0.6971] [0.3901] [0.2878] [0.0173] [0.0794] [0.5395] [0.4972] [0.0424] [0.2309] 
Post-ind. adjustment: Top 3 PE-backed -49.65% -31.29% -26.33% -16.69% -15.40% -35.30% -83.10% -17.82% -36.48% 
 Other PE-backed -51.46% -30.42% -36.19% -62.22% -61.07% -60.49% -67.55% -63.74% -50.52% 
 p-value [0.4772] [0.5393] [0.5557] [0.0138] [0.0812] [0.3187] [0.7853] [0.0183] [0.2653] 
Panel B: Percentage Change in Assets Turnover 
Pre-ind. adjustment: Top 3 PE-backed -4.69% -2.32% -9.57% -9.76% -12.02% -19.04% -16.98% -8.99% -12.76% 
 Other PE-backed -0.98% -0.88% -6.71% -12.74% -10.59% -8.70% -12.41% -8.48% -12.49% 
 p-value [0.9809] [0.3316] [0.9692] [0.2401] [0.9085] [0.1512] [0.3284] [0.7362] [0.5905] 
Post-ind. adjustment: Top 3 PE-backed -9.85% -7.74% -33.92% -21.07% -37.14% -46.82% -37.50% -29.15% -31.24% 
 Other PE-backed -3.94% 1.36% -31.54% -34.13% -28.06% -24.53% -38.80% -28.99% -30.34% 
 p-value [0.8633] [0.2766] [0.7533] [0.1401] [0.9069] [0.548] [0.6583] [0.6556] [0.747] 
Panel C: Percentage Change in Cash Flow to Sales 
Pre-ind. adjustment: Top 3 PE-backed -19.01% -12.59% 6.04% 6.35% 5.32% -5.38% -7.81% 5.21% -3.91% 
  Other PE-backed -20.22% -12.00% 3.24% -2.30% -13.81% -12.83% -10.21% -6.58% -10.37% 
  p-value [0.8289] [0.7849] [0.3678] [0.2661] [0.1381] [0.4224] [0.914] [0.2301] [0.3544] 
Post-ind. adjustment: Top 3 PE-backed -56.63% -28.60% 7.30% -1.68% 8.48% -10.20% -48.28% 10.47% -6.06% 
  Other PE-backed -42.72% -21.19% -10.79% -22.20% -27.26% -31.57% -40.63% -19.64% -23.04% 
  p-value [0.2198] [0.6721] [0.4209] [0.7427] [0.8032] [0.7154] [0.6583] [0.5498] [0.9192] 
Table 9: Median Operating Performance - Buyouts Backed by Young PE Firms vs. Buyouts Backed by Other PE Firms 
Cash Flow equals net sales less cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expense before depreciation depletion and amortisation. Asset Turnover equals 
total sales to total assets.   Year -1 is the last full financial year immediately before the IPO completion year and Year +1 is the first full financial year immediately after the 
IPO completion year.  3 Year Avg and 5 Year Avg refer to the mean performance of the first three years and the five years after IPO respectively.  Industry performance is 
computed by using the industry average of the relevant accounting items.  industry adjustment is made by subtracting the matched industry performance from the 
performance of each sample firm. Young PE refer to the PE firms which aged 10 years or younger when they backed our sample buy-outs.  
Year Relative to Completion of IPO Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year +1 Year +2 Year +3 Year +4 Year +5 
3 Year 
Avg 
5 Year 
Avg 
Panel A: Cash Flow to Total Assets                     
Pre-ind. adjustment: Young PE backed  0.1788 0.1591 0.2217 0.1655 0.1803 0.1742 0.1967 0.1608 0.1667 0.1736 
 Other PE backed 0.1630 0.1994 0.2187 0.1898 0.1817 0.1754 0.1641 0.1512 0.1842 0.1817 
Post-ind. adjustment: Young PE backed  0.0269 0.0690 0.0778 0.0140 0.0088 -0.0009 -0.0017 0.0028 -0.0025 -0.0128 
 Other PE backed 0.0145 0.0282 0.0609 0.0405 0.0157 0.0325 0.0245 -0.0070 0.0292 0.0254 
Observations Young PE backed  12 15 20 17 18 18 17 16 17 13 
 Other PE backed 64 64 70 75 74 70 65 66 66 55 
Panel B: Assets Turnover           
Pre-ind. adjustment: Young PE backed  1.7511 1.7255 1.6556 1.6880 1.6336 1.6470 1.4013 1.4436
c
 1.7522 1.8219
c
 
 Other PE backed 1.7699 1.6362 1.7633 1.4406 1.5243 1.3928 1.3667 1.3458
c
 1.6238 1.4751
c
 
Post-ind. adjustment: Young PE backed  0.4235 0.4582 0.4379 0.4566 0.4088 0.4937 0.2743 0.3657 0.5111 0.4627 
 Other PE backed 0.5956 0.5094 0.5522 0.2935 0.3107 0.3741 0.4101 0.2762 0.3781 0.4197 
Observations Young PE backed  14 16 21 21 21 21 19 17 21 17 
 Other PE backed 67 67 73 94 94 88 75 72 82 68 
Panel C: Cash Flow to Sales           
Pre-ind. adjustment: Young PE backed  0.0842 0.1274 0.1505 0.1495 0.1197 0.1114 0.0969 0.0880 0.1397 0.0949 
 Other PE backed 0.1065 0.1211 0.1490 0.1468 0.1408 0.1359 0.1251 0.1238 0.1366 0.1394 
Post-ind. adjustment: Young PE backed  -0.0168 0.0236 0.0286 -0.0182 -0.0363 -0.0336 -0.0448 -0.0400 -0.0347 -0.0409 
 Other PE backed -0.0243 -0.0094 0.0111 0.0017 -0.0056 -0.0035 -0.0128 -0.0204 -0.0047 -0.0109 
Observations Young PE backed  12 15 20 19 19 19 17 16 19 15 
  Other PE backed 67 67 73 76 76 72 67 68 69 57 
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Table 10: Percentage Change in Operating Performance - Buyouts Backed by Young PE Firms vs. Buyouts Backed by Other PE Firms 
Cash Flow equals net sales less cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expense before depreciation depletion and amortisation. Asset Turnover 
equals total sales to total assets.   Year -1 is the last full financial year immediately before the IPO completion year and Year +1 is the first full financial year 
immediately after the IPO completion year.  3 Year Avg and 5 Year Avg refer to the mean performance of the first three years and the five years after IPO 
respectively.  Industry performance is computed by using the industry average of the relevant accounting items.  industry adjustment is made by subtracting the 
matched industry performance from the performance of each sample firm. The % change is computed by subtracting Year -1 level of performance from each year's 
performance and dividing the difference by the year-1 level.  Young PEs refer to the PE firms which aged 10 years or younger when they backed our sample 
buyouts.  The p-values reported are based on the Wilcoxon two sample difference test (two tailed). 
Year Relative to 
Completion of IPO   
Year -3 to 
Year -1 
Year -2 to 
Year -1 
Year +1 to 
Year -1 
Year +2 to 
Year -1 
Year +3 to 
Year -1 
Year +4 to 
Year -1 
Year +5 to 
Year -1 
3 Year Avg 
to Year -1 
5 Year Avg 
to Year -1 
Panel A: Percentage Change in Cash Flow to Total Assets 
Pre-ind. adjustment: Young PE-backed -20.52% -5.05% -11.31% -23.42% -16.51% -30.57% -27.00% -25.54% -19.09% 
 Other PE-backed -23.27% -16.00% -0.46% -5.00% -8.27% -19.85% -34.28% -10.35% -15.82% 
 p-value [0.6539] [0.5419] [0.2304] [0.1863] [0.6228] [0.4164] [0.5225] [0.1845] [0.6793] 
Post-ind. adjustment: Young PE-backed -55.19% -30.42% -43.07% -73.04% -63.32% -52.16% -73.64% -71.53% -44.99% 
 Other PE-backed -49.65% -25.51% -27.87% -26.15% -38.74% -48.35% -69.10% -26.30% -37.03% 
 p-value [0.9539] [0.8941] [0.1909] [0.0739] [0.2009] [0.3508] [0.676] [0.0861] [0.2672] 
Panel B: Percentage Change in Assets Turnover 
Pre-ind. adjustment: Young PE-backed 1.12% -0.35% -6.71% -16.93% -10.42% -12.52% -15.52% -8.48% -7.18% 
 Other PE-backed -5.48% -2.63% -8.61% -10.37% -15.20% -12.00% -19.04% -9.85% -12.76% 
 p-value [0.1197] [0.2592] [0.3985] [0.222] [0.0932] [0.2789] [0.1808] [0.3162] [0.3152] 
Post-ind. adjustment: Young PE-backed -1.71% 1.29% -8.53% -18.82% -10.92% -30.37% 17.70% -19.98% -11.18% 
 Other PE-backed -9.07% -5.02% -34.67% -31.48% -39.18% -36.97% -40.48% -38.51% -32.87% 
 p-value [0.8001] [0.6149] [0.0215] [0.128] [0.016] [0.3926] [0.1231] [0.0393] [0.0861] 
Panel C: Percentage Change in Cash Flow to Sales 
Pre-ind. adjustment: Young PE-backed -17.40% -12.78% -11.01% -11.41% -23.36% -20.85% -21.72% -16.06% -17.89% 
  Other PE-backed -20.21% -11.45% 3.49% 5.28% 1.85% -2.65% -9.27% 3.37% -4.21% 
  p-value [0.7961] [0.8192] [0.0625] [0.1762] [0.0879] [0.1588] [0.5095] [0.0553] [0.1538] 
Post-ind. adjustment: Young PE-backed -55.82% -33.61% -79.76% -91.76% -94.24% -133.53% -140.61% -95.59% -90.79% 
  Other PE-backed -44.21% -20.60% 5.79% -0.90% 12.19% -13.69% -39.28% 8.80% -10.60% 
  p-value [0.6477] [0.5513] [0.0101] [0.0258] [0.01] [0.0252] [0.1069] [0.013] [0.0093] 
  
Table 11: Number of Months from Buyout Transaction to IPO  
        
Young PE-backed buyouts refer to buyouts which are backed by PEs aged 10 years or younger.   
        
No. of months to IPO Young PE-backed buyouts All Other PE-backed buyouts 
All other PE and non-PE-
backed buyouts 
Median 27.5 34 39 
Mean 31.3 43.24 47.55 
S.D. 15.38 29.02 32.55 
Min 8 4 0 
Max 61 114 183 
Count 20 101 152 
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test statistics (Two tailed):   
Ho: No. of months to IPO (Young PE-backed ) = No. of months to IPO (All other PE-backed )  
Z value: 1.274  
Prob > |z|:  0.2027  
Ho: No. of months to IPO (Young PE-backed ) = No. of months to IPO (All other sample buyouts ) 
Z value: 1.985  
Prob > |z|:   0.0471    
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 Figure 2: Asset Turnover
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Figure 3: Cash Flow to Sales
Sample Firms vs. Industry 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year +1 Year +2 Year +3 Year +4 Year +5
Year Relative to IPO Completion
C
a
s
h
 F
lo
w
 t
o
 S
a
le
s
Cash Flow to Sales (median) Buy-out firms Cash Flow to Sales (median) Industry 
 
 
